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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

SOVIET FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY

SUMMARY

1. The Soviet Government anticipates an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world. It therefore seeks to increase its relative power by building up its own strength and undermining that of its assumed antagonists.
2. At the same time the Soviet Union needs to avoid such a conflict for an indefinite period. It must therefore avoid provoking a strong reaction by a combination of major powers.
3. In any matter deemed essential to its security, Soviet policy will prove adamant. In other matters it will prove grasping and opportunistic, but flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered.
4. The Soviet Union will insist on exclusive domination of Europe east of the general line Stettin-Trieste.
5. The Soviet Union will endeavor to extend its predominant influence to include all of Germany and Austria.
6. In the remainder of Europe the Soviet Union will seek to prevent the formation of regional blocs from which it is excluded and to influence national policy through the political activities of local Communists.
7. The Soviet Union desires to include Greece, Turkey, and Iran in its security zone through the establishment of "friendly" governments in those countries. Local factors are favorable toward its designs, but the danger of provoking Great Britain and the United States in combination is a deterrent to overt action.
8. The basic Soviet objective in the Far East is to prevent the use of China, Korea, or Japan as bases of attack on the Soviet Far East by gaining in each of those countries an influence at least equal to that of the United States.
9. The basic Soviet military policy is to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible hostile combination. On the completion of planned demobilization these forces will still number 4,500,000 men.
10. For the time being the Soviets will continue to rely primarily on large masses of ground troops. They have been impressed by Anglo-American strategic air power, however, and will seek to develop fighter defense and long range bomber forces.

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11. The Soviets will make a maximum effort to develop as quickly as possible such special weapons as guided missiles and the atomic bomb.

12. Further discussion of Soviet foreign policy is contained in Enclosure "A"; of Soviet military policy, in Enclosure "B".

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ENCLOSURE "A"SOVIET FOREIGN POLICYTHE BASIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. Soviet foreign policy is determined, not by the interests or aspirations of the Russian people, but by the prejudices and calculations of the inner directorate of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. While the shrewdness, tactical cunning, and long-range forethought of this controlling group should not be minimized, its isolation within the Kremlin, ignorance of the outside world, and Marxist dogmatism have significant influence on its approach to problems in foreign relations.

2. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy may be world domination. Such a condition is contemplated as inevitable in Communist doctrine, albeit as a result of the self-destructive tendencies of capitalism, which Communist effort can only accelerate. In view, however, of such actual circumstances as the marked indisposition of democratic nations to adopt the Communist faith and the greatly inferior war potential of the Soviet Union in relation to them, that goal must be regarded by the most sanguine Communist as one remote and largely theoretical. While acknowledging no limit to the eventual power and expansion of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership is more practically concerned with the position of the U.S.S.R. in the actual circumstances.

3. For the present and the indefinite future the fundamental thesis of Soviet foreign policy is the related proposition that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capitalist states is in the long run impossible. Consequently the U.S.S.R. must be considered imperiled so long as it remains within an antagonistic "capitalist encirclement."* This concept, absurd in relation to so vast a country with such wealth of human and material resources and no powerful or aggressive neighbors, is not subject to rational disproof precisely because it is not the result of objective analysis. It is deeply rooted in a haunting sense of internal and external insecurity inherited from the Russian past, is required by compelling internal necessity as a justification for the burdensome character of the Soviet police state and derives its authority from the doctrine of Marx and Lenin.

4. On the basis of this concept of ultimate inevitable conflict, it is the fundamental policy of the Soviet Union;

a. To build up the power of the Soviet state; to assure its internal stability through the isolation of its citizens from foreign influences and through the maintenance of strict police controls; to maintain armed forces stronger than those of any potential combination of foreign powers; and to develop as rapidly as possible a powerful and self-sufficient economy.

b. To seize every opportunity to expand the area of direct or indirect Soviet control in order to provide additional protection for the vital areas of the Soviet Union.

* In this context socialism (as distinguished from communism) is considered as antagonistic as capitalism.

c. To prevent any combination of foreign powers potentially inimical to the Soviet Union by insistence upon Soviet participation, with veto power, in any international section affecting Soviet interests, by discouraging through intimidation the formation of regional blocs exclusive of the U.S.S.R., and by exploiting every opportunity to foment diversionary antagonisms among foreign powers.

d. To undermine the unity and strength of particular foreign states by discrediting their leadership, fomenting domestic discord, promoting domestic agitations conducive to a reduction of their military and economic strength and to the adoption of foreign policies favorable to Soviet purposes, and inciting colonial unrest.

5. Although these general policies are premised upon a conviction of latent and inevitable conflict between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, they also assume a postponement of overt conflict for an indefinite period. The doctrine of Marx and Lenin does not forbid, but rather encourages, expedient compromise or collaboration with infidels for the accomplishment of ultimate Communist purposes. The Soviet Union has followed such a course in the past and has need to do so still, for time is required both to build up its own strength and to weaken and divide its assumed antagonists. In such postponement, time is calculably on the side of the Soviet Union, since natural population growth and projected economic development should result in a gradual increase in its relative strength. It is manifestly in the Soviet interest to avoid an overt test of strength at least until, by this process, the Soviet Union has become more powerful than any possible combination of opponents. No date can be set for the fulfillment of that condition. The Soviet Union must therefore seek to avoid a major open conflict for an indefinite period.

6. The basis of Soviet foreign policy is consequently a synthesis between anticipation of and preparation for an ultimate inevitable conflict on the one hand and need for the indefinite postponement of such a conflict on the other. In any matter conceived to be essential to the present security of the Soviet Union, including the Soviet veto power in international councils, Soviet policy will prove adamant. In other matters Soviet policy will prove grasping, but opportunistic and flexible in proportion to the degree and nature of the resistance encountered, it being conceived more important to avoid provoking a hostile combination of major powers than to score an immediate, but limited, gain. But in any case in which the Soviet Union is forced to yield on this account, as in Iran, it may be expected to persist in pursuit of the same end by subtler means.

SOVIET POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EASTERN EUROPE

7. It is apparent that the Soviet Union regards effective control of Europe east of the Baltic and Adriatic Seas and of the general line Stettin-Trieste as essential to its present security. Consequently it will tolerate no rival influence in that region and will insist on the maintenance there of "friendly" governments - that is, governments realistically disposed to accept the fact of exclusive Soviet domination. That condition being met, the U.S.S.R. does not insist upon a uniform pattern of political and economic organization,

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but adjusts its policy in accordance with the local situation. The immediate Soviet objective is effective control, although the ultimate objective may well be universal sovietization.

8. In some cases no Soviet coercion is required to accomplish the desired end. In Yugoslavia and Albania the Soviet Union finds genuinely sympathetic governments themselves well able to cope with the local opposition. In Czechoslovakia also, although the government is democratic rather than authoritarian in pattern, no interference is required, since the Communists and related parties constitute a majority and the non-Communist leaders are "friendly." Even in Finland the Soviet Union has been able to display moderation, Finnish leaders having become convinced that a "friendly" attitude is essential to the survival of the nation. In these countries the Soviet Union seeks to insure its continued predominance by the creation of strong bonds of economic and military collaboration, but does not have to resort to coercion other than that implicit in the circumstances.

9. In Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria, however, the Soviet Union encounters stubborn and widespread opposition. The "friendly" governments installed in those countries are notoriously unrepresentative, but the Soviet Union is nevertheless determined to maintain them, since no truly representative government could be considered reliable from the Soviet point of view. In deference to Western objections, elections may eventually be held and some changes in the composition of these governments may be permitted, but only after violent intimidation, thoroughgoing purges, electoral chicanery, and similar measures have insured the "friendly" character of the resulting regime. Continued political control of the countries in question will be reinforced by measures insuring effective Soviet control of their armed forces and their economies.

10. The elected government of Hungary was both representative and willing to be "friendly," but the Soviet Union has apparently remained unconvinced of its reliability in view of the attitude of the Hungarian people. Accordingly coercion has been applied to render it unrepresentatively subject to Communist control in the same degree and manner as are the governments of Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The end is the same as that of the policy pursued in those countries - the secure establishment of a reliably "friendly" regime, however unrepresentative, coupled with Soviet control of the economic life of the country.

SOVIET POLICY IN AUSTRIA AND GERMANY

11. Soviet policy in Austria is similar to that in Hungary, subject to the limitations of quadripartite occupation. Having accepted an elected Austrian government and unable to reconstruct it at will, the Soviet Union is seeking, by unilateral deportations and sequestrations in its own zone and by demands for similar action in others, to gain, at least, economic domination of the country as a whole and to create, at most, a situation favorable toward a predominant Soviet political influence as well, on the withdrawal of Allied control. The Soviet Union will prevent a final settlement, however, until it is ready to withdraw its troops from Hungary and Rumania as well as Austria.

12. The Soviet Union hitherto has been content to proceed with the consolidation of its position in eastern Germany free of quadripartite interference. Now, rejecting both federalization and the separation of the Ruhr and Rhineland, it appears as the champion of German unification in opposition to the "imperialistic" schemes of the Western powers. A German administration strongly centralized in Berlin would be more susceptible than any other to Soviet pressure, and the most convenient means of extending Soviet influence to the western frontiers of Germany. The initial Soviet objective is presumably such a centralized "anti-Fascist" republic with a coalition government of the eastern European type, but actually under strong Communist influence and bound to the Soviet Union by ties of political and economic dependency.

SOVIET POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE

13. For a time it appeared that the Communist Party in France might prove able to gain control of that country by democratic political processes and Soviet policy was shaped to support that endeavor. The Communists' recent electoral reverses, however, appear to have led the Soviet Union to sacrifice a fading hope of winning France to a livelier prospect of gaining Germany. The French Communists remain a strong political factor nevertheless, and exercise disproportionate influence through their control of organized labor. That influence will be used to shape French policy as may be most suitable for Soviet purposes, and to prepare for an eventual renewal of the attempt to gain control of France by political means. A resort to force is unlikely in view of the danger of provoking a major international conflict.

14. In Italy also the Communist Party is seeking major influence, if not control, by political means, with a resort to force unlikely in present circumstances. The Party and the Soviet Union have played their cards well to divert Italian resentment at the proposed peace terms from themselves toward the Western Powers.

15. The Soviet Union misses no opportunity to raise the Spanish issue as a means of embarrassing and dividing the Western Powers. Any change in Spain might afford it an opportunity for penetration. Even its goading of the Western Powers into expressions of distaste for Franco appear to have afforded it an opportunity to approach him.

16. For the rest, the Soviet Union is concerned to prevent the formation of a Western Bloc, including France and the Low Countries, or a Scandinavian Bloc, in accordance with its general policy. As opportunity offers, it will seek to facilitate the growth of Communist influence in Scandinavia and the Low Countries, but not at the sacrifice of more important interests or at the risk of provoking a strong reaction.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

17. The Middle East offers a tempting field for Soviet expansion because of its proximity to the Soviet Union and remoteness from other major powers, the weakness and instability of indigenous governments (except Turkey, and the

many local antagonisms and minority discontents. It is, moreover, an area of Soviet strategic interest even greater than that of eastern Europe, in view of the general shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but still within range of air attack from the south, and of the vital importance of Baku oil in the Soviet economy. It is in the Middle East, however, that Soviet interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger of precipitating a major conflict. Soviet policy in the area must therefore be pursued with due caution and flexibility.

18. Given the opportunity, the Soviet Union might be expected to seek the following objectives:

- a. At least the withdrawal of British troops from Greece, and at most the incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establishment of a "friendly" government.
- b. At least the political and military isolation of Turkey and the imposition of a new regime of the Straits more favorable to Soviet interests; at most the incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establishment there of a "friendly" government.
- c. At least implementation of the recent settlement with Iran, which assures the Soviet a continued indirect control in Azerbaijan and an opportunity to develop any oil resources in northern Iran; at most, incorporation of that country in the Soviet sphere through the establishment there of a "friendly" government.

Soviet policy in pursuit of these objectives will be opportunistic, not only in relation to the local situation, but more particularly in relation to the probable reactions of the major powers.

19. Soviet interest in the Arab states is still directed rather toward exploiting them as a means of undermining the British position in the Middle East than as objectives in themselves. Their principal asset, the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would be economically inaccessible, although its denial to Britain and the United States in the event of war would be of important consequence. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of British troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey and Iran. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit anti-British sentiment among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue.

20. The Soviet Union has shown no disposition to intrude into the involved Indian situation, possibly finding it as yet impossible to determine the most advantageous course in that regard. It also shows no present aggressive intentions toward Afghanistan, although the establishment of a "friendly" government there would seem a logical, albeit low priority, objective.

SOVIET POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

21. The basic Soviet objective in China, Korea, and Japan is to prevent their becoming potential bases of attack on the Soviet Far East. This requires

that the U.S.S.R. exert with respect to each an influence at least equal to (and preferably greater than) that of any other power. Since in this region Soviet policy encounters that of the United States, it must be pursued with due circumspection.

22. Although the Soviet Union cannot hope to establish a predominant influence over the whole of China, at least for a long time to come, it could accomplish its basic objective through either the formation of a coalition government, with the Chinese Communist Party* as a major participant, or a division of the country, with the Chinese Communist Party in exclusive control of those areas adjacent to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. should logically prefer the former solution as at once involving less danger of a collision with the United States and greater opportunity for the subsequent expansion of Soviet influence throughout China through political penetration by the Communist Party, and the course of its relations with the Chinese Government would seem to confirm that preference. The U.S.S.R., however, would not be willing to sacrifice the actual political and military independence of the Chinese Communists unless assured of their effective participation in the proposed coalition. If, therefore, efforts to establish such a coalition were to fail and unrestricted civil war were to ensue, the Soviet Union would probably support the Chinese Communists in their efforts to consolidate their effective control over Manchuria and North China.

23. In Korea the Soviets have shown that they will consent to the unification of the country only if assured of a "friendly" government. In default of unification on such terms, they are content to consolidate their control in the north and to bide their time, trusting that an eventual American withdrawal will permit them to extend their predominant influence over the whole country.

24. The Soviets have been extremely critical of American administration in Japan, which has afforded them no opportunity to establish the degree of influence they desire. Regardless of the prevailing influence, they probably desire to see Japan politically and militarily impotent. The greater Japan's political disorganization, the greater would be their opportunity to establish an equal and eventually predominant influence there.

SOVIET POLICY ELSEWHERE

25. Soviet policy in other areas will follow the general lines set forth in paragraph 3, seeking to undermine the unity and strength of national states, to foment colonial unrest, to stir up diversionary antagonisms between states,

* Despite a widespread impression to the contrary, the Chinese Communists are genuine Communists, differing from other foreign Communist Parties only in a certain local self-sufficiency derived from territorial control and the possession of an army, in consequence of which they exhibit unusual initiative and independence. In all essentials they are an unusually effective instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

and to disrupt any system of international cooperation from which the U.S.S.R. is excluded. Activity along these lines is constant, though often inconspicuous. Its importance to the Soviet Union derives not from any prospect of direct gain, but from its effect in enhancing the relative power of the U.S.S.R. by diminishing that of potential antagonists.

26. Because of their position in world affairs, the United States and Great Britain will be the primary targets of such Soviet activities. In addition to domestic agitations, the effort will be made to distract and weaken them by attacks upon their interests in areas of special concern to them. In Latin America, in particular, Soviet and Communist influence will be exerted to the utmost to destroy the influence of the United States and to create antagonisms disruptive to the Pan American system.

ENCLOSURE "B"

SOVIET MILITARY POLICY

1. Soviet military policy derives from that preoccupation with security which is the basis of Soviet foreign policy. (See Enclosure "A", paragraphs 3 and 4a.) On the premise that the peaceful coexistence of Communist and capitalist states is in the long run impossible, and that the U.S.S.R. is in constant peril so long as it remains within a "capitalist encirclement," it is the policy of the Soviet Union to maintain armed forces capable of assuring its security and supporting its foreign policy against any possible combination of foreign powers. The result is an army by far the largest in the world (except the Chinese).
2. Even the populous Soviet Union, however, cannot afford an unlimited diversion of manpower from productive civil pursuits, especially in view of manpower requirements for reconstruction and for the new Five Year Plan. Consequently it has had to adopt a demobilization program which is a compromise between the supposed requirements of security and those of the economy. By September the strength of the armed forces will have been reduced from 12,500,000 to 4,500,000 men."* Further reduction is unlikely.
3. The probable geographical distribution of the total strength indicated will be 1,100,000 in occupied Europe, 650,000 in the Far East, and 2,750,000 in the remainder of the U.S.S.R. The composition will be 3,200,000 (71%) in the ground forces and rear services, 500,000 (11%) in the air forces, 300,000 (7%) in the naval forces, and 500,000 (11%) in the MVD (political security forces). The post-war reorganization includes unification of command in a single Ministry of the Armed Forces having jurisdiction over all forces except the MVD troops, which remain under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
4. In addition to its own forces, the Soviet Union is assisting and participating in the reconstitution of the armed forces of its satellites in such manner as to insure its effective control of them. While in this its object is primarily political, such forces supplement its own as locally useful auxiliaries.
5. Soviet experience during the war was limited almost exclusively to the employment of large masses of ground troops spearheaded by mobile tank-artillery-infantry teams. Air power was employed chiefly for close ground support. Naval operations were insignificant. The Soviets had only limited experience in amphibious operations, almost none in airborne operations, and none with carrier-based air operations.
6. It appears that for the time being the Soviet Union will continue to rely primarily on large masses of ground troops, but with emphasis on increased mechanization and further development of the tank-artillery-mobile infantry spearhead. The ground support capabilities of the air forces will be maintained.

* As compared with 562,000 in 1933 and 1,000,000 in 1935.

At the same time, the Soviets may be expected to give increased attention to the strategic employment of air power, in view of demonstrated Anglo-American capabilities in that regard, and to develop both fighter defense and long range bomber forces.

7. Although there have been indications that the eventual development of a high seas fleet (or fleets) is a Soviet intention, its early accomplishment is prohibited by inexperience, lack of shipbuilding capacity, and the higher priority of other undertakings. Even were these hindrances overcome, geography handicaps the Soviet Union as a naval power, since naval forces on its several coasts would be incapable of mutual support. It is, however, within the capabilities of the Soviet Union to develop considerable submarine, light surface, and short-range amphibious forces.

8. The industrial development, which competes with the armed forces for manpower, is, of course, intended to enhance the overall Soviet war potential. Beyond that, intensive effort will be devoted to the development of special weapons, with particular reference to guided missiles and the atomic bomb. Some reports suggest that the Soviets may already have an atomic bomb of sorts, or at least the capability to produce a large atomic explosion. In any case, a maximum effort will be made to produce a practical bomb in quantity at the earliest possible date.

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